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In 2007, the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong is notin good shape. It appears that universal suffrage will not beimplemented even in 2012. The movement has held no for-
mal dialogue with the Chinese authorities since the establish-
ment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) in 1997. The Chinese leadership’s apparent inse-
curity has been much exacerbated by the massive protest rally
on 1 July 2003 and the subsequent political turmoil((1); as a re-
sult, the Chinese authorities have become more active in con-
taining the influence of the pro-democracy movement. In the
crucial Legislative Council elections in September 2004, for
example, the pro-democracy parties believed that they were
competing with the state machinery directed by Beijing((2).
On the other hand, the survival of the pro-democracy camp is
guaranteed by two factors. All parties concerned realise the im-
portance of the maintenance of the rule of law and the free-
dom of information flow; and Hong Kong people still value the
maintenance of checks and balances and they consider that
support for the pro-democracy camp in elections constitutes an
important means of limiting the power of the HKSAR govern-
ment. It is also interesting to note that in the Chief Executive
election this year, opinion surveys consistently reflected that
about two-thirds of the people in Hong Kong wanted to see
competition in the election, although everyone expected Don-
ald Tsang to win and the level of support for Alan Leong, the
pro-democracy movement’s candidate, stayed at 20% or so.
Support for the movement in the Election Committee elec-
tions in December 2006 even surpassed expectations((3). 
Hong Kong people’s values have been changing. Experi-
ences from the decade since the territory’s return to the
Motherland have probably lowered people’s expectations
concerning economic growth, career development and in-
creases in incomes. They expect the government to assume
a more significant role in the economy. They begin to pay
more attention to family issues, environmental protection,
preservation of the territory’s historic sites, and so on. Ap-
parently, neither the government nor the major political par-
ties have been able to grasp this value change; and this in
turn means that people’s satisfaction with the respective per-
formances of the government and political parties has been
in decline (see tables 1 and 2).
This article attempts to analyse and assess the pro-democ-
racy movement in the decade between 1997-2007 from the
perspective of people’s expectations, the movement’s inter-
nal dynamics, the community’s changes in values, and the
problems and challenges ahead.People ’s  expectations
According to Thomas W. P. Wong, in 1997, in selecting the
most important values from the four choices of economic pros-
perity, social stability, personal freedom and political democ-
racy, more than half (56%) of respondents chose social stabil-
ity, 24.7% economic prosperity, 11.1% political democracy, and
8.2% personal freedom((4). In times of political uncertainty, it
was natural that people opted for stability first. Perhaps people
were already aware that Hong Kong was a mature economy
and one could no longer expect rapid economic growth. How-
ever, what constituted the foundation of social stability was still
not clear; and it was also likely that the perceptions of the
major ingredients of social stability changed in accordance with
the prevailing conditions. For example, when the economy was
in bad shape and the unemployment rate was very high, peo-
ple were more concerned with the economy and the job mar-
ket (see table 3). In the months before July 2003, people were
obviously angry with the proposed Article 23 legislation((5) and
the performance of the Tung administration (see table 1).
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1. See the author’s edited work, The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event, Hong
Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2005.
2. See the author’s “Hong Kong’s Democrats Stumble,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, n°
1, 2005, pp. 138-152.
3. See all the major newspapers in Hong Kong, 11 and 12 December 2006.
4. Thomas W. P. Wong, “Core Values: Revelations from Research in Hong Kong’s Social
Indicators (1988-2001),” in Siu-kai Lau et al. (eds), Trends and Challenges in Social
Development: Experiences of Hong Kong and Taiwan (in Chinese), Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006, p. 108.
5. Article 23 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s constitution) states: “The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to
prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies from conducting political activities in the
Region, and to prohibit political organisations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties
with foreign political organisations or bodies”. This article was written into the draft Basic
Law after the massive protest rallies in Hong Kong during the Tiananmen Incident in 1989;
obviously, the Chinese authorities were concerned with a repetition of such activities.
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C. H. Tung in his very first policy address indicated that
his administration intended to be more pro-active((6). He
was obviously concerned with the territory’s declining in-
ternational competitiveness. His housing policy of provid-
ing 85,000 units per annum was an attempt to lower the
cost of accommodation which had increasingly become un-
affordable for ordinary Hong Kong people; but he also
perceived high real estate prices as a significant factor in
pushing up Hong Kong’s cost structure, making its goods
and services more costly and less competitive. He placed a
high priority on education as a means, again, to improve
Hong Kong’s international competitiveness in the long run;
while his emphasis on services for the elderly reflected his
concern for the demands of an ageing population and the
community’s rising expectations for improvements in social
services.
Table 1. People’s satisfaction with the HKSAR Government (half-yearly average, 1997-2006)
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The Tung administration was wise enough not to initiate the controversial legislative
process in its first term. In response to the open promoting of the Chinese authorities, a
paper addressing the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law was finally unveiled
for public consultation in September 2002. As expected, the proposals stirred fears of a
crackdown on human rights groups and the Falun Gong. The pro-democracy camp in the
territory also perceived the proposals to pose a threat to civil liberties. See South China
Morning Post (an English language newspaper in Hong Kong), 25 September 2002.
6. For Tung’s first policy address, see http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa97/
english/paindex.htm, retrieved on 28 February 2007.
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Undeniably the sharp deterioration in the territory’s economic
performance since 1997 caused much misery and dissatisfaction
among Hong Kong people. The average annual rate of per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth fell from 4.5% in
the period 1983-1997 to 1.9% in 1997-2001. Almost full em-
ployment was maintained from 1985 to mid-1997 as the unem-
ployment rate ranged from 1.3% to a peak of only 3.5%. Since
Hong Kong’s return to China, the unemployment rate climbed
from 2.1% in mid-1997 to a record high of 8.7% in mid-2003((7).
The weakening of the Hong Kong economy, however,
began much earlier. Real per capita GDP growth in Hong
Kong fell from an annual average of 5.2% in the 1980s to
3.5% in 1990-1996; and per worker GDP annual growth fell
from 4.7% to 3.3%((8). Further, a group of economists at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong observed that the total
factor productivity in the manufacturing sector had been de-
clining from 1984 to 1993; its study shows that “the manu-
facturing sector could produce in 1993 only 87% of the out-
put in 1984((9)”. Access to cheap labour in the Pearl River
Delta and the huge profits it generated had weakened the
local manufacturing sector’s incentive to invest to raise its
technological level, in contrast to the other three “little drag-
ons of Asia”. The “economic bubble” in the run-up to 1997
generated by dramatic rises in prices in the real estate mar-
ket and stock market also made the economic adjustment
process much more painful.
Though the Tung administration failed to solve Hong
Kong’s economic problems, the pro-democracy movement
did not have much to offer in terms of the territory’s eco-
nomic development strategy either. It was not able to demon-
16 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
7. Sung Yun-wing, “Hong Kong Economy in Crisis,” in Siu-kai Lau (ed), The First Tung
Chee-hwa Administration, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002, p. 123.
8. Tsang Shu-ki, “Changing Structure of Hong Kong’s Economy,” in Gungwu Wang and
John Wong (eds), Hong Kong in China: The Challenges of Transition, Singapore: Times
Academic Press, 1999, p. 108.
9. Kwong Kai-sun et al., The Impact of Relocation on Total Factor Productivity of Hong Kong
Manufacturing, mimeograph, Hong Kong: Department of Economics, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong, August 1997.
Table 2. Ratings of major political groups, 1998-2006.
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strate significant initiatives in presenting Hong Kong people
with well-researched policy alternatives. It failed to perform
the role of an effective and constructive opposition from the
perspective of a policy platform. According to Lau Siu-kai’s
survey in 2001, 63.6% of respondents indicated that the
Chief Executive could not represent their respective views,
and only 12.1% of respondents said he could. Similarly, 51.7%
of respondents felt that the HKSAR government could not
represent their respective views, and only 15.2% felt that it
could. But the Democratic Party did not fare much better:
46% of respondents indicated that it could not represent their
respective views, and only 13.4% said it could. The public af-
fairs concern groups were considered most representative:
only 22.1% of respondents felt they could not represent their
respective views, while 38.6% indicated that they could((10).
The Democratic Party and other pro-democracy groups
often argue that they have prepared many policy discussion
papers, but they have not been able to secure the attention
of the government and the media. Hence they have not
been able to generate discussion within the community.
Since 1997, the HKSAR government has been treating the
pro-democracy movement as the opposition, and has been
trying hard to limit its impact on the government’s policy de-
liberation processes; such efforts have been supported by the
media’s “self-censorship” too. It has to be admitted that the
media generally do not anticipate that the pro-democracy
groups’ policy proposals will make an impact, hence they do
not have much interest in them. Nonetheless, the pro-
democracy groups as the opposition have to seek ways to in-
fluence and mobilise the community, especially the groups
affected by their policy proposals; but their success has often
been limited. This is especially so in economic policy discus-
sions, because the business community and the pro-business
professional groups believe that their best way to influence
the government is to engage in quiet lobbying efforts; con-
tacts and dialogue with the pro-democracy groups are per-
17N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
10. See Lau Siu-kai, “Socio-economic Discontent and Political Attitudes,” in Siu-kai Lau et
al. (eds), Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2001, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003, p. 69.
Table 3. Perceived problems in Hong Kong most mentioned by respondents in telephone surveys 
conducted by the government, 1997-2003. 
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ceived to be useless and may even be counter-productive as
they may offend Beijing and the HKSAR government.
In terms of the community’s social policies and the change
in its values, neither the government nor the political par-
ties have been responsive. It does not appear that they
have been trying hard to understand the issues. In the final
years of the Tung administration and before the re-election
of Donald Tsang, the HKSAR government had neither the
political will nor the initiative. Yet the pro-democracy move-
ment has not been effective in the policy areas of educa-
tion, health insurance, youth work, community-building,
and so on itself. Globalisation has led to a widening of the
gap between rich and poor; even young university graduates
have become uncertain of their middle-class status. The
slowing down of economic growth, the downsizing of the
civil service and most public-sector organisations, the
streamlining of enterprises to enhance their profit rates,
etc., mean that the younger generations of middle-class pro-
fessionals and executives encounter more limited opportuni-
ties((11), and will probably have to seek out new sources of
satisfaction. This trend may promote the further develop-
ment of civil society, or may exacerbate the community’s
dissatisfaction and lead to protests. 
Taiwan offers an interesting example. The democratisation
process since the late 1980s has been accompanied by an
impressive development of civic groups. Many of them en-
gage in large-scale philanthropic activities attracting volun-
tary work and donations. In a few cases of natural disaster
relief campaigns, their voluntary workers reached the sites
ahead of government personnel. Despite the recent disillu-
sionment with the political parties, the development of civic
groups in Taiwan has not been adversely affected. Appar-
ently, neither the political parties nor the existing civic
groups in Hong Kong have been able to exploit this poten-
tial. In contrast with the 1980s, the appeal of the pro-democ-
racy political parties for the student unions of the territory’s
tertiary education sector has been in decline. 
11. Ohmae Kenichi, The Impact of a Rising Lower-middle Class Population in Japan: What
Can We Do About It? (in Japanese), Tokyo: Kodansha, 2006.
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Mass protests took place to oppose art 23 of the Basic Law, July 2003
At the same time, the keen interest of the community in the
protection of Victoria Harbour and the preservation of some
historical sites including the Star Ferry Pier in Central in re-
cent years has caught the government and all political par-
ties by surprise. The government was complacent in view of
the improved economic conditions: the unemployment rate
gradually declined to 5% in mid-2006, and the economic
growth rate rose from 1.8% in 2002 to 3.2% in 2003, 8.6%
in 2004 and 7.3% in 2005((12). The pro-democracy political
parties, on the other hand, have been perceived as insensi-
tive to the community’s changing values.Elec tions  and pol it ical  r e fo rms
Apparently most Hong Kong people still adopt a utilitarian
attitude towards democracy. They see democracy as a
means to realise practical, concrete objectives. Few Hong
Kong people really practice democracy as a way of life.
Since Hong Kong people treat democracy as a means to an
end, they are prudent in the calculation of the costs of polit-
ical participation. While they perceive democracy as an im-
portant means to guarantee their freedom, their lifestyles
and their living standards which they treasure, they also con-
sider that one’s own efforts are probably more important and
key in improving one’s life((13). In view of the broad trends of
economic globalisation, they are now probably less confident
of their individual hard work, and expect a more active role
of the government.
Upon the return of the territory to China, the vast majority
of Hong Kong people had, to some extent, accepted the sub-
stitution of stability and prosperity for democracy. They low-
ered their expectations of democracy because they realised
that this was not a realistic goal, but they did value the high
living standards that the territory had been offering them.
Changes in such factors, however, and the mood of the com-
munity would also change, and dramatically. The massive
demonstrations in response to Tiananmen in 1989 were a
vivid example. On 1 July 2003, more than half a million peo-
ple took to the streets to protest against the Article 23 legis-
lation and demand democracy. People who took part in the
rally felt that they were making history, and were proud of the
peace and order among the protesters. The crisis attracted
much international media attention, and it also became an
issue high on the agenda of the Chinese leadership.
The massive protest rally on 1 July 2003 was a major boost
for the morale of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement.
Opposition to the Article 23 legislation was linked to the de-
mand for democracy, and the anger with the Tung administra-
tion also highlighted the importance that democracy had. Peo-
ple realised that they had no part in the re-election of Tung;
and despite his terrible performance, the community could not
force him to step down. The pro-democracy camp understood
that it could not mobilise hundreds of thousands of people to
march on the streets all the time; and it therefore hoped to use
the elections to send a message to the Tung administration,
Beijing and the world that Hong Kong people had not forgot-
ten the popular demand for democratisation.
The record voter turnout (44.1%) was the most important
feature of the November 2003 District Council elections
(see table 4). After the 1 July 2003 demonstrations, Hong
Kong people came out to vote in the local elections to ex-
press their dissatisfaction with the government and reiterate
their demand for democratisation. At the beginning of
2003, most observers agreed that the pro-government Dem-
ocratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB)
would secure a major victory in the upcoming District Coun-
cil elections. The party’s confidence was reflected by the
number of candidates it fielded (see table 5). The DAB,
with massive political donations from the pro-Beijing busi-
ness groups, had, over decades, cultivated an impressive
grassroots network. Further, DAB District Councillors and
candidates-in-waiting had worked hard for their constituents.
They provided subsidised banquets, picnics, and package
tours; they were attentive to local needs and offered services
ranging from free haircuts to free medical consultations, free
medicine for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),
etc. But the DAB’s support for the Tung administration and
its position on the Article 23 legislation became conspicuous
political liabilities. The other pro-government parties, the
Liberal Party and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, suf-
fered only minor losses (see table 5).
The Democratic Party reversed its decline of recent years
and in 2003 gained nine more seats to reach 95. The party
certainly benefited from the public’s dissatisfaction with the
Tung administration, the associated anger with the DAB,
and the upsurge in demand for democracy in the commu-
nity, symbolised by the 1 July protest rally. The Democratic
Party fielded 120 candidates, in comparison with DAB’s
206, demonstrating its earlier appreciation of the need to
consolidate. The relatively large number of District Council-
lors is an important asset of the Democratic Party in terms
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12. Hong Kong Statistics: Understanding the Present, Planning the Future, poster released
by the Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR Government, early July 2006.
13. See the author’s edited work, Political Participation in Hong Kong – Theoretical Issues
and Historical Legacy, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 1999.
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of financial and human resources and grassroots networks.
The party remains the largest and the most powerful organ-
isation within the pro-democracy camp. Meanwhile, the
other pro-democracy groups, for example, The Frontier and
the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s
Livelihood (ADPL), also performed well in the District
Council elections (see table 5).
While in the 2003 District Council elections the pro-democ-
racy camp was seen to have won and the DAB to have suf-
fered a serious setback, in terms of actual distribution of po-
litical force in the 18 District Councils, the pro-democracy
camp enjoyed a majority in only seven councils, while pro-
government members held a majority of ten, with a balanced
situation in Kowloon City. This scenario further deteriorated
20 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
Table 4. Voters and voter turnout rates in District Council elections, 1982-2003.
Table 5. Performance of major political parties in District Council Elections, 1994-2003.
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as a result of the appointment system which gave the Tung
administration the opportunity to reward its supporters and
tip the respective political balances in favour of the govern-
ment in several District Councils. After the appointments,
the pro-democracy camp enjoyed a majority on only two Dis-
trict Councils. The pro-government majorities on the remain-
ing 16 District Councils mean that the councils’ resources
will largely be denied to the pro-democracy camp. The vic-
tory for democracy therefore should be seen largely in terms
of the political messages sent by the voters.
An important weakness of the pro-democracy camp was re-
vealed by the number of candidates it fielded, about two
hundred altogether in four hundred constituencies. The rel-
atively low number of candidates was a sign of difficulties in
political recruitment. Further, the strengths of the DAB dis-
cussed above remain, and again it is expected to do well in
the upcoming 2007 District Council elections, an appropri-
ate reward for its impressive services at the grassroots level.
The momentum of the pro-democracy movement was only
partly maintained in the September 2004 Legislative Coun-
cil elections. Voter turnout reached a new high of 55.6%, up
a staggering 12% from that in 2000. About 1.78 million
Hong Kong people cast their votes (see table 6). In terms
of the number of seats won, the pro-democracy camp did not
do very well. It secured 18 in the geographical constituen-
cies—two more than in 2000, and seven in the functional
constituencies—two more than in 2000 (see table 7). The
results could have been better((14).
The pro-democracy camp was probably adversely affected by
scandals, hostile media and backward campaign strategies. In
terms of the share of votes won, the pro-democracy camp in-
creased its share from 58.2% in 2000 to 60.5% in 2004.
However, this was still slightly lower than its share of 63.2%
in 1998((15). In the context of a record voter turnout and the
turnout for the protests on 1 July 2003 and 1 July 2004, this
was slightly disappointing because the pro-government legis-
lators managed to retain their majority in the legislature, and
the pro-democracy groups would remain in the opposition,
with little impact on the legislative process. But this is exactly
the design of the electoral system, which serves to deny the
pro-democracy groups a majority in the legislature despite
their absolute majority support in the direct elections. The
Legislative Council elections in 2004 also failed to generate
meaningful discussions on the significance of the elections
and the related important policy issues.
The Tsang administration then offered its political reform
package which suggested increasing the seats in the Legisla-
tive Council in 2008 to five directly-elected seats and five
functional constituency seats. The latter would be returned
by District Councillors, implying that the pro-democracy
groups could hope to win two or three seats from such addi-
21N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
14. See the author’s “Hong Kong’s Democrats Stumble,” art. cit., pp. 138-152.
15. These percentages vary a little depending on who is counted as a member of the pro-
democracy camp. Experts differ to a small extent regarding the exact categorisation of
one or two marginal/controversial candidates.
Table 6. Voters and voter turnout rates in Legislative Council Elections, 1991-2004.
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tional functional constituency seats((16). The pro-democracy
movement insisted on a timetable and a road map for the im-
plementation of universal suffrage for the elections of the Chief
Executive and the entire legislature. It refused to accept the gov-
ernment package as a compromise interim measure. According
to the Basic Law, there should be a review of the systems for
the elections after 2007, hence the reform package from the
Tsang administration. Any proposals for reform, however, had
to secure two-thirds majority support in the legislature first, and
this provision gave the pro-democracy legislators power of veto.
They were encouraged by the impressive turnout of a protest
rally (250,000 according to the organisers, and 63,000 accord-
ing to the police) on 4 December 2004 rejecting the reform
package((17), and managed to maintain their solidarity against the
Tsang administration’s attempts to win over six of them to se-
cure the required two-thirds majority support.
The rejection of the political reform package by 24 votes
was largely seen as a major setback for the Tsang adminis-
tration((18). It was hardly a victory for the pro-democracy
movement though, because public opinion was in favour of
supporting the reform package. The Chinese authorities
perceived this adamant position as confrontational and ter-
minated their more friendly approach towards the pro-
democracy groups initiated after the September 2004 Leg-
islative Council elections. Pro-democracy groups had now
to face a lack of electoral reforms in the foreseeable future,
a considerable disappointment to their second-line leaders.
By then, in the absence of any realistic chance of achiev-
ing breakthroughs, the pro-democracy movement lost its
momentum.
22 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
16. For the political reform package, see the website of the Constitutional Reform Bureau of
the HKSAR government at http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/past/index.htm, retrieved on
28 February 2007. See also all major newspapers on 22 December 2005.
17. South China Morning Post, 5 and 6 December 2005.
18. Ibid., 22 December 2005.
Table 7. Results of major political parties in Legislative Council elections in terms of seats
won, 1991-2004.
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Problems and chall enges  ahead
For over a decade the pro-democracy movement proved effec-
tive in its electoral campaigns. In the direct elections to the leg-
islature, it would normally secure about 60% of the electorate’s
support. This was mainly due to the political wisdom of a ma-
jority of Hong Kong voters who wanted to maintain effective
checks and balances by returning pro-democracy candidates to
the legislature to avoid the government enjoying unlimited pow-
ers. Without democratic reforms, it is difficult to imagine how
the pro-democracy camp can win a majority of seats in the leg-
islature within the existing electoral system. Hence the pro-
democracy camp is not perceived as a credible alternative gov-
ernment, and it has not made much of an effort to achieve such
an objective. It has not been able, for example, to present a
shadow cabinet. Alan Leong’s candidacy in the 2007 Chief Ex-
ecutive election represented an attempt on the part of the move-
ment to offer a comprehensive policy platform, but the debates
on it were limited.
Most Hong Kong people now accept that the issue of political
reforms in the territory will be determined by the Chinese lead-
ership, and they are reluctant to engage in confrontation with the
Chinese authorities. They appreciate the fact that while there is
no democracy in China, they are unlikely to be able to expect
genuine democracy in Hong Kong. In the last couple of years,
the new Chinese leaders have been tightening control of the
media, Internet information services, dissidents, non-governmen-
tal organisations, etc., and prospects for political reform in China
are not promising. In the longer term, however, there is greater
optimism based on the belief that economic reforms and liber-
ties will ultimately introduce democratic reforms.
Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities have been refusing to en-
gage in a formal dialogue with the pro-democracy groups, partly
as a sanction against their role in the Tiananmen Incident and
their subsequent demand to reverse the official verdict on the
issue, and partly as an element of the Chinese authorities’ gen-
eral campaign to discredit the pro-democracy groups. There is no
lack of informal contacts though, with the purpose of collecting
information from activists and engaging in the usual united front
tactics of winning over those who can be won over. Neither are
the pro-democracy groups ready for a dialogue; and there is in-
adequate solidarity, trust and co-ordination among them to for-
mulate a strategy for negotiations. The groups are notorious for
not being able to keep secrets, and they fail miserably in avoid-
ing leakage of confidential information to the media. Hence the
easy way out is to stick to the bottom line inflexibly, while flexi-
bility or tactical concessions may be easily accused of betrayal.
The responses to Donald Tsang’s administration’s political re-
form package are a typical example.
Given their strong position, the Chinese authorities have no
intention of negotiating. They treat the pro-democracy
groups within a united front framework; in fact, they proba-
bly treat all groups in the territory within such a framework.
Their basic policy is to push the pro-democracy groups to accept
23N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
Donald Tsang was reelected as Chief Executive 
in March 2007 without a clear agenda for universal suffrage
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their fundamental policy position on Hong Kong. This accept-
ance will be rewarded, probably along the lines of their treat-
ment of the “democratic parties” in China. But this is political
suicide even for the pro-Beijing political groups in the territory.
The ADPL chose to stay in the un-elected provisional legisla-
ture in 1997 instead of boycotting it like other pro-democracy
groups; in the 1998 legislative elections, it lost all four seats in
the Legislative Council (see table 7). The passive toeing of the
Beijing line by the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance finally led
to its demise in 2004; it lost all four seats in the Legislative
Council elections and was forced to merge with the DAB in the
following year (see table 7).
Following the logic of the united front strategy, the pro-democ-
racy groups opposing the Beijing line most strongly would be
singled out for severe sanctions for demonstrative effect. The
Civic Party formally launched in March 2006 based on the Ar-
ticle 45 Concern Group rejected Donald Tsang’s political re-
form package, and the business community was secretly warned
against giving donations to the new party. The pro-Beijing mass
media also concentrated their criticisms against the group so
much so that the Democratic Party felt the pressure lift.
Beijing’s united front strategy has largely failed to divide the
pro-democracy groups in any significant manner, but solidar-
ity among them has nonetheless been severely threatened.
Before Hong Kong’s return to China, there was substantial
moral and public opinion pressure to maintain unity within
the pro-democracy camp. Such pressure soon evaporated
after July 1997. In the frustration of the political wilderness,
differences in political orientation were exacerbated and
could no longer be contained. Differences initially centred
on three issues: a) the relationship with the Chinese author-
ities and the HKSAR government; b) whether to aggregate
class interests or to articulate more clearly labour and grass-
roots interests; and c) whether priority should be given to ef-
fecting change by working within the legislature, or resorting
to mass movements outside the political establishment.
Today, The Frontier still adopts the puritanical position of re-
fusing to take part in the functional constituency elections to
the Legislative Council. In the 2007 Chief Executive elec-
tion, Alan Leong’s campaign was mainly supported by the
Civic Party and the Democratic Party. The Frontier, the
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, and the Neigh-
bourhood and Worker’s Service Centre all refused to take
part in this “small circle” election; and the newly-formed
League of Social Democrats even actively opposed Alan
Leong’s campaign.
These differences in political orientation were even more se-
rious within the Democratic Party, as it was easier for the
pro-democracy groups to ignore their inter-group differences.
The frustrations of the “young Turks” of the Democratic
Party led to their challenge of the party leadership in De-
cember 1998((19). The “young Turks” and the non-main-
stream factions were opposed to efforts to improve relations
with the Chinese authorities by means such as presenting
candidates to compete for seats in China’s National People’s
Congress. They were not interested in a better relationship
with the HKSAR government and publicly called for Tung
to resign. Regarding the party’s policy platform, they warned
the party leadership against opportunism in attempting to
represent the interests of all classes. In turn, they were ac-
cused of trying to turn the party into a labour party and
adopting a populist approach. Above all else, the “young
Turks” and the non-mainstream factions appealed for a re-
turn to the grassroots to mobilise the masses instead of en-
gaging in futile parliamentary politics.
The differences within the Democratic Party led to several
waves of departure from the party on the part of the more rad-
ical members. These movements tarnished the image of the
party. At the same time, the pro-democracy political parties
encountered difficulties, too, in their relationship with grass-
roots community organisations which emerged and developed
in the late 1960s and 1970s, and had been supporting pro-
democracy political groups. The pro-democracy political par-
ties certainly did help in raising issues of importance with
grassroots community organisations in the legislature or with
senior government officials, thus exerting pressure on the
Tung administration to provide solutions. But their high pro-
file and eagerness for publicity often resulted in failures to
compromise and in delays in achieving settlements. Many
grassroots community organisations worried that they might
be taken for a ride, and they often preferred to act without the
involvement of political parties. After all, grassroots commu-
nity organisations were issue-oriented; they wanted concrete
solutions to their problems. A few cases of unpleasant experi-
ences have resulted in their alienation from the pro-democracy
political parties. On the other hand, they have been eagerly
courted by the pro-Beijing political groups which apparently
have been making progress in their united front work.
Over the last decade, a new generation of political activists
has emerged and assumed leadership in many small grass-
roots community organisations. These activists are less inter-
ested in the pursuit of democracy in the territory, and are
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19. Ivan Chi-keung Choy, “A Coup in the Frosty Month – Counter-attack by the Non-main-
stream Factions of the Democratic Party (in Chinese),” Ming Pao (a Chinese language
newspaper in Hong Kong), 16 December 1998.
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more focused on environmental protection, community-build-
ing, gay rights, labour grievances, services for under-privi-
leged groups, etc. They adopt more radical positions, and
perceive the pro-democracy political parties as part of the
political establishment. They resent the latter’s concentra-
tion on parliamentary work, and criticise many pro-democ-
racy leaders as politicians only interested in their own polit-
ical careers. Their promotion of gay rights and rights for
prostitutes sometimes creates difficulties for the participation
of conservative religious groups. 
The differences among pro-democracy political parties,
within the Democratic Party, and between pro-democracy
political parties and grassroots community organisations are
complicated and sometimes petty as well as personal. But
they have attracted considerable media attention, and re-
sulted in damage to the reputation of all parties concerned.
Moreover, these quarrels have also caused disappointment
among ordinary supporters of the pro-democracy movement.
It was in this context that new groups such as Power for
Democracy, Hong Kong Democratic Development Network
and Civil Human Rights Front emerged in early 2002. They
planned to concentrate on the cause of democracy and
human rights, and wanted to offer an alternative to political
parties in political participation. Their emergence and devel-
opment reflected the disappointment with political parties in
the pro-democracy camp and the suspicions against its politi-
cians. It was significant that these new groups were domi-
nated by church activists and academics who were generally
seen as having no political ambitions. At the time of the
movement against the Article 23 legislation, these groups at-
tempted to bring together various types of organisation in
support of democracy and human rights because of the de-
cline in appeal of the pro-democracy political parties, the
suspicions against them, and the in-fighting among them and
between them and the grassroots community organisations.
This was not a healthy phenomenon as political parties had
the resources and the most important role to play in the push
for democracy in the territory. Moreover, these new groups
are very limited in resources, and the pro-democracy parties
are reluctant to follow their lead. The Civil Human Rights
Front has become dominated by the new generation of po-
litical activists, and its relationship with the pro-democracy
political parties is now problematic. Power for Democracy
still assumes a useful role in the co-ordination of the pro-
Table 8. Popularity of pro-democracy 
legislators, 1998-2007. (20)
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20. Web site of the Public opinion programme of the University of Hong Kong, POP Polls:
Rating of top Ten Legislative Councillors. Retrieved from http://hkupop.hku.hk/
english/popexpress/lcrating/topten2.html on 28 February 2007.
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democracy camp’s electoral campaigns in the 2003 District
Council elections, 2004 Legislative Council elections, and
the 2007 District Council elections.
The pro-democracy movement at this stage and in the near fu-
ture would be handicapped by three serious constraints. In
comparison with the DAB and even the Liberal Party, the
pro-democracy parties have not been successful in political re-
cruitment. Businessmen and business executives are reluctant
to be seen to be associated with them because of their increas-
ingly close business ties with mainland China. The problem is
more serious in terms of the generation gap. It is expected that
most of their leaders will retire in the coming decade because
of age (see table 8); yet the talents among the second-tier
leadership are not promising. The cultivation of successors has
been accorded inadequate effort and commitment.
In general, pro-democracy political parties including the
Civic Party have financial problems. The Taiwan model in
which enterprises offer donations to all political parties ac-
cording to their relative strengths is the envy of the pro-
democracy camp in Hong Kong. District Councillors affili-
ated to the pro-democracy political parties in Hong Kong
normally have to contribute one-tenth of their salaries and al-
lowances to pay for the functioning of their respective party
headquarters, while District Councillors of the DAB are
said to receive a monthly subsidy of about US$4,000 each
in support of their constituency work. This disparity illus-
trates the financial plight of the political opposition and ex-
plains the impressive grassroots services of the DAB.
As political parties in Hong Kong are cadre parties, they are
very dependent on the media for image building and projec-
tion to maintain their appeal to the community. Hence the
self-censorship of the local media is probably the most com-
mon complaint among pro-democracy legislators. Most
media are in the hands of major business groups, which al-
most without exception have substantial business activities in
mainland China. Hence media operators do not want to an-
tagonise Beijing. Worse still, some media owners even use
them as a tool to cultivate business ties with the Chinese au-
thorities. After all, the latter fully appreciate the importance
of the media in containing the pro-democracy movement;
most media operators have been granted the honour of
membership of the National Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Self-censorship is obviously not a problem with the interna-
tional media. But after 1997, Hong Kong as a special ad-
ministrative region cannot expect to attract much interna-
tional media attention. In view of the importance of business
ties and good relations with China, fewer and fewer West-
ern governments are willing to articulate their support for
democracy in Hong Kong. Pro-democracy groups in the ter-
ritory are very careful and have been circumscribed in their
ties with Taiwan and the United States.
Upon Hong Kong’s return to China, the community’s ex-
pectations of democracy had been lowered and the pro-
democracy movement’s development was limited by the
more hostile environment—in contrast to the encourage-
ment from the British colonial administration in its final
years. The failure of the Tung administration and the
provocative Article 23 legislation process brought the pro-
democracy movement to a high once again. With the ben-
efit of hindsight, the high tide revealed the restrictions im-
posed by the design of the electoral system, and it also
showed that the Chinese authorities were ready to inter-
vene to defend their fundamental interests in and position
on Hong Kong. The dilemma for the pro-democracy move-
ment is that while trying to secure the acceptance of the
Chinese authorities would be political suicide, posing a
genuine challenge would provoke a substantially higher de-
gree of intervention. But the choice is obvious, i.e. to main-
tain the integrity of the movement in anticipation of
democracy in China.
Survival of the pro-democracy movement, fortunately, is guar-
anteed by two factors. All parties concerned realise the impor-
tance of the maintenance of the rule of law and the freedom
of information in the territory to ensure its functioning as an in-
ternational financial centre and international business services
centre. A majority of Hong Kong voters also want to guaran-
tee a minimum of checks and balances by returning pro-democ-
racy candidates in Legislative Council elections. Despite all
the limitations in financial resources and media self-censorship,
the existence of the pro-democracy movement in the territory
will not be threatened for the foreseeable future.
Immediate prospects are not promising in that genuine univer-
sal suffrage will not likely be implemented by 2012; and the
Chinese authorities’ efforts to contain the pro-democracy
movement and support the Tsang administration will continue.
In the absence of an unexpected morale booster, such as the
July 2003 protest, pro-democracy groups cannot realistically ex-
pect to secure substantial gains in the upcoming 2007 District
Council elections and the 2008 Legislative Council elections.
Better co-ordination among pro-democracy groups and more
serious contributions to policy studies in areas such as edu-
cation and health insurance are their immediate challenges,
and they will be judged on this basis by their supporters and
the media. Their past record is obviously not impressive, but
there is no reason to be unduly pessimistic either. •
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